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Assessing competition policy performance metrics: concerns
about cross-country generalisability
Indian Journal of Economics and Business
Abstract
Recent interest in competition policy performance has typically relied on subjective performance
metrics that have undergone little direct scrutiny by users. We examine the quality of the popular
World Economic Forum's antitrust performance metric and assess whether it is immune from
perception-bias. A bias-free metric is required to ensure cross-country consistency in its intended
performance assessment.
We note various instances where the WEF's competition policy performance survey was
completed but where there existed neither competition legislation nor an associated enforcement
agency at the time. This seeming inconsistency is neither amenable to traditional econometric
heterogeneity treatment nor instrumentable; importantly, it is likely to embed non-random error
onto the WEF antitrust survey.
We test and discuss some possible explanations for the observed bias: we find that both halo
effects and a nation's modest experience with market institutions may be responsible for the bias.
Underscoring these results may be the fact that survey respondents may not share a common
understanding of competition policy. We offer some discussion supporting this latter point.
The presence of these biases may invalidate the usefulness of cross-nationally valid rankings of
competition policy performance. On the bright side, however, the results suggest that efforts
aimed at enhancing stakeholders' understanding of the objectives and limitations of competition
policy might in turn enhance competition policy's impact as well as perceptions of performance.
Keywords: International Competition Policy, Performance Index, World Economic Forum
Survey
JEL Classification: C81, K21, L40, L44, F53
I. INTRODUCTION
"... the efficiency and stability of an economy requires that all consumers be part of the franchise,
in reality and in perception, so that good economic policies, including privatizations and free
markets when they make sense, receive broad support."
Daniel McFadden, American Economic Association Presidential Address (2006)
Are competition policy programs in developing economies accomplishing what they set out to
do? Appraising the effectiveness of a policy is of fundamental importance if a nation is to
formulate the most cost-effective policy instrument for disciplining anticompetitive behavior.

Answering such a question requires an unbiased measure of the quality of competition policy
performance in a cross-nationally valid way.
Existing examinations of competition policy performance have varied in their choice of
performance metric: some have relied on traditional industrial organization structural measures
and variables (Tavares de Araujo 1996; Hayri & Dutz 1999; Dutz & Vagliasindi 1999; Kee &
Hoekman 2003; Rodriguez 2006), on qualitative assessments (Fingleton, Fox, Neven& Singleton
1996), on idiosyncratic surveys (Serbrisky 2004). Still other studies have relied on subjective,
perceptions-based surveys of performance (Lee 2004; Krakowski 2005; Nicholson, Sokol &
Stiegert 2006; Sokol & Stiegert 2007; Rodriguez & DeNardis 2007). This perceptions-based,
competition policy survey measure also figures prominently as an original source in the World
Bank's composite measures of governance database (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999)
and the WEF Competitiveness Rankings, databases that have been richly mined by researchers
and practitioners.
The practice of using perceptions-based surveys either individually or as an input into a
composite measure has raised a number of concerns including the basic validity of the surveys
and their sensitivity to external biases (Rodrik 2004; Van De Walle 2005; Knack 2006; Thomas
2006; Arndt & Oman 2006; Kurtz & Schrank 2007a, 2007b; Kaufmann, Kray & Mastruzzi
2007a, 2007b, 2007c). In this paper, we examine whether the WEF's perceptions-based survey
measure of performance reflects measurement error. Importantly, the issue that concerns us here
is that respondents may interpret the identical survey question differently.
Our criticism of survey bias is different from that of the critics noted above. When it comes to
appraising competition policy performance, we claim that that the evidence we discuss below
reveals that the bias evident in survey responses arises from a fundamental misunderstanding of
the role, methodology and objectives of competition policy by survey respondents across
countries. Put differently, survey respondents hold a heterogeneous understanding of competition
policy.
Thus, the problem we flag remains even if one were to acknowledge one of the main points
raised by the critics, that survey responses are biased because they largely reflect the view of
business elites. It is possible that survey designers could attempt to address the allegations of
impartiality by incorporating voices from ideologically distinct groups, such as citizen's
associations, NGOs, or multilateral organizations (Kaufmann, Kray & Mastruzzi 2007a, 2007b,
2007c). However, to the extent the information asymmetry--misunderstanding the role of
competition policy--persists across the dissimilar interest groups, the problem we examine
remains.
We surmise that the confusion or misunderstanding over the role, objectives and limitations of
competition policy leading to the observed asymmetry in appraising antitrust performance are a
result of (at least) some combination of the following: (a) the novelty of antitrust policy and
practice in many jurisdictions; (b) sparse experience with market mechanisms; (c) the presence
of different competitive concerns in different countries which therefore conditions the views of
the competition agency's performance held by the survey respondents; and (d) imprecise survey
instruments.

As a result of this confusion, survey respondents conflate a misunderstanding of antitrust policy,
varying policy preferences, institutional performance and operational outcomes with the survey
metrics. In other words, the survey is unable to elicit a clear conceptual distinction between the
respondent's understanding of a policy based on the maximization of consumer welfare, the
performance of the agency in enforcing the law, and disappointment (or confusion) over the
results of the enforcement agency investigations.
The issue is not the typical correlation across measurement errors in survey responses resolved
by artfulness in selecting an appropriate econometric instrumental variable. Rather it is a
problem based on concept formation that defies any possibility of finding a suitable instrument.
In this paper, we also attempt to examine the contextual difficulties leading to the perception
problem. This bias can naturally emerge due to either unfamiliarity--misunderstanding of the
objectives, tools and procedures of competition law enforcement by survey respondents in
countries with little experience with market mechanisms and where competition policy is a novel
instrument. If this is the case, published surveys undermine the soundness of either systematic
cross-country or inter-temporal assessments of competition policy performance and may
similarly affect the usefulness of governance indices that rely on the competition policy
performance metric.
Our examination focuses primarily on developing economies where the survey problems
typically emerge. This confusion is not surprising, modern competition policy is a relatively
novel experience in many developing economies. However, the conclusion may be generalized
popular misunderstanding of the role and administration of competition policy may not
necessarily be unique to either developing economies or recent adopters of competition
legislation (Aiginger, McCabe, Mueller & Weiss 2001).
On the bright side, the observed asymmetry over the role and objectives of antitrust policy
highlight the need for heightened public relations/educational efforts in disseminating agency
goals and objectives. Indeed, such a step is probably necessary to garner political and popular
support for the competition policy program and thereby enhance its effectiveness.
Our paper is organized as follows. We provide some background on the difficulties encountered
by perceptions-based performance metrics in the next section. In the third section, we then
provide some empirical evidence to support our argument. Succinctly, published results reveal
considerable variance in the cross-country surveys published by the World Economic Forum. We
observe that this asymmetry worsens for poorer countries and for countries with less experience
with both antitrust law and with market mechanisms suggesting possible conceptual differences
in understanding competition policy, agency performance, possible disappointment in outcomes,
or a combination of the three. Admittedly, such empirical results are also consistent with the fact
that the survey results are properly gauging poorly performing competition policy programs
where the observed variance can be attributed to measurement error. But we also examine an
interesting feature of the competition policy survey: in many countries survey respondents
completed surveys appraising competition policy when the country had no competition law. The
last section provides some concluding comments.

II. OPINIONS AS TO THE ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY VARY ACROSS
COUNTRIES
The World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report surveys businessmen to rate the
effectiveness of the antitrust policy in their particular country, asking them to rate
"antimonopoly" policy from "1 = lax and not effective and promoting competition" to "7 =
effectively promotes competition". According to the WEF, the survey is completed by
businessmen, in its entirety. Specifically, in the 2005 round of the survey 14 percent of
respondent firms were foreign-owned, 30 percent of all respondent firms had less than 50
employees, 43 percent of firms had fewer than 100 employees and 19 percent of firms surveyed
had more than 1000 employees.
Asymmetry in Standard Deviation of the Survey Responses Suggests Respondents May be
Interpreting the Question Differently
The World Economic Forum reports the average score from each country's survey responses as
well as the standard deviation of the responses. According to the WEF, the standard deviation
"gives an indication of how closely or widely the individual responses are spread around the
mean country score." In other words, this provides information on the extent of agreement or
disagreement on the question within the given country."
The relationship between the reported competition policy performance survey average and its
standard deviation is shown in the figure below.
The relationship indicates an inverse relationship between antitrust performance and survey
robustness. There are, of course, numerous plausible explanations for the observed asymmetry in
the survey standard deviation. It could be the effect of an unobserved variable. For example, the
variance in responses could be a result of the fact that there are fewer reporters dedicated to the
coverage of economic issues in a particular nation, which would include lower awareness levels
of antitrust issues. It could also be a reflection of the lack of specialized media diffusing antitrust
interventions or accomplishments. It could be survey idiosyncracies such as lower response rates
in those particular countries scoring poorly in antitrust performance.
The observed dispersion in the survey-response standard deviation across countries offers
support for an alternative thesis. We believe that businessmen are interpreting the question
differently across countries. We also find that for several countries, respondents answered the
competition policy appraisal question although there was no formal competition policy
legislation in place. We examine this evidence in the two following sections.
Competition Policy Performance Scores: Errors
We find many countries with a reported Global Competitiveness Report score for antitrust policy
performance in the respective country surveys despite the fact that they did not yet have an
antitrust law at the time of publication. Since the antitrust law typically creates the antitrust
policy enforcement agency which subsequently establishes the policy (its operational aspects), it

is difficult to understand how it is possible to appraise competition policy performance unless
those surveyed misunderstood the question, exhibit susceptibility to halo effects, or both.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Indonesia for example, appeared in the first GCR survey in 1996 with a score in the
Effectiveness of Anti-Monopoly survey of 2.88 in 1996, 2.59 in 1999 and 3.3 in 2000, yet
Indonesia did not adopt an antitrust law until 1999 but effective in 2000. The PKKU, the
Indonesian Competition Authority was not up and running until 2001. Mozambique, makes its
appearance in the 2003/04 GCR survey with a score of 2.3. It scored a 2.6 in the 04/05 survey,
improved to a 3.3 in the 05/06 survey and declined to a 3.0 in the latest 06/07 survey.
Mozambique does not yet have a competition law (as of the summer of 2007). Ethiopia appears
on the 2003/04 survey for the first time with a score of 2.7 followed by a 2.9 in the 04/05 report,
a 2.7 in the 05/06 and a 3 in the 06/07 report. Ethiopia formally had a competition law in April
2003 but was unable to establish, fund and commence operations of an agency until 2005.
Ecuador scores a 3.18 in the 1999 survey, a 3.2 in the 2000 survey, a 2.5 in 2001/02 survey, a 2
in the 2002/03 survey, and a 2.5, 2.3, 2.3, 2.6, respectively in the following years. Ecuador does
not yet have a competition law. The Ukraine makes its appearance in 2000 with a 3.3 and a 3.3 in
2001, although its antitrust law was not approved until January 2001. Trinidad & Tobago scores
a 2.9 in 2002/03, a 2.8 in 03/04, a 3.0 in 04/05, a 3 in 05/06 and 3.1 in 06/07. Trinidad & Tobago
does not have a competition law. The Slovak Republic scores a 3.94 in 1999, a 4.2 in 2000 and a
3.8 in 01/02 despite the fact that they did not adopt a competition law until 2001. Haiti comes in
at 2.4 in 02/03, 2.3 in 2003/04 and appears in none of the two subsequent reports. Haiti has no
competition law.
III. EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF BIAS
To determine the effectiveness of the WEF's survey results we first examine the correlation
between the antitrust scores reported by the WEF in their Global Competitiveness Report for
2003-04 and a "corrected" vector in which the countries that had both a score in the WEF listing
and a antitrust law and competition agency during 2003. The latter array has a 1 for a particular
country in 2003 if there was both a reported WEF score and a law and enforcement agency, and
a 0 otherwise. The correlation between these two arrays is 0.5459, indicating poor correlation
between the reported scores for the two years.
We also empirically examine the elements underscoring the misreporting of performance
assessments in a multivariate framework. We define the dependent variable to be a measure of
disagreement, taking the value one if there is an antitrust score reported in the 2003/2004 GCR
but no law or competition agency is present and zero if it reports an antitrust performance score
and there exists a competition law and a competition agency anytime during 2003.
We hypothesize that a survey respondent's knowledge about competition policy is related to the
amount and quality of information on competition policy available in the business environment.
The amount and quality of information will depend on media coverage and understanding of the
role an administrative agency has in a market economy. We have no data on the extent of media
coverage of competition policy matters; we therefore use data on years of experience with a

market economy as a proxy. We also examine the extent to which halo effects impact the
likelihood of a survey respondent appraising a policy that does not officially exist. We use the
logarithm of the change in nominal gdp per capita between 2002 and 2003 as the test variable.
Thus we propose the following model:

P(Disagreement) = [alpha]
+ [beta](Log of Market Experience)
+ [gamma](Log of Annual Growth in Nominal GDP) (1)
Where:
P(Disagreement): reflects the probability of disagreement in the survey response. Specifically a
binary variable coded one if an antitrust performance score was returned but there was no
competition policy or competition agency anytime during 2003.
Market Experience: represents the number of years of experience with a market economy. The
variable is derived from the data on trade liberalization dates found in Appendix 2-B of
Wacziarg & Welch (2003). Wacziarg & Welch identify the year in which uninterrupted openness
began for a country. We calculate the market experience variable as of 2004; thus, a country
which opened up in 1992 would have 12 years of experience with a market economy.
Annual Growth in Nominal GDP: entails the percent change in nominal GDP between 2002 and
2003. The variable is intended to capture "halo effects" whereby survey respondents infer the
antitrust policy performance answer based on the economy's recent performance. Source: IMF
World Economic Outlook Database, April 2004.

We expect the probability of a disagreement to be negatively correlated with market experience
as well as with recent macroeconomic performance. Increased knowledge of market institutions
is likely to enhance understanding of the role of competition policy and thereby reduce the
likelihood of a disagreement. Similarly, to the extent that increased macroeconomic performance
proxies for performance assessment it would increase the likelihood of a disagreement thus we
should observe a negative relationship between the two variables. Probit results are presented in
Table 11, below.
We find statistically significant support for the "halo effects" argument suggesting that survey
respondent' marks are influenced by the economy's recent (nominal) performance. We also find
support (statistically significant at the 10 percent level) for the contention that survey
respondents are less likely to make mistakes the more familiar they are with market institutions,
including, presumably, the competition agency.
IV. WHY ARE PERCEPTIONS OF COMPETITION POLICY PERFORMANCE
DIFFERENT?
There many plausible reasons why expectations and understanding of competition policy's goals
and methodology vary across many developing economies. In this section we discuss several
features of competition policy administration that may explain the presence of assessment errors.
Many of the countries which were ascribed a competition policy performance score but had not
yet adopted a formal competition code and enforcement agency were not totally devoid of
antimonopoly legislation. Competition or antimonopoly "legislation" in some countries is found
in constitutional proscriptions, in sectoral legislation--such as telecom privatization initiatives-or
in treaty agreements such as the Cotonou agreement. Thus, survey respondents could have
sensibly been alluding to this prior legislation when ascribing a performance score. However,
modern antitrust codes and the traditional constitutional antimonopoly proscriptions or treatybased proscription such as the Cotonou agreement are dramatically different in their formulation
and implementation. Moreover, for many years, competition codes proscribing anticompetitive
practices coexisted with economic models that relied little on market mechanisms; as a result,
competition policy was, for the most ignored and ineffective.
Modern competition policy codes recently adopted in developing and reforming economies are
largely fashioned on the U.S. and European Union model. It is a model based on microeconomic
efficiency considerations and enforced by an independent agency. Similarly, privatization
legislation, e.g. telecomm, granted competition policy oversight to national regulatory
authorities. In practice, however, these specific attributes of the regulations are typically
sidelined for practical and budgetary reasons.
Nonetheless, even in instances where WEF survey respondents may have mentally or
subconsciously been alluding to these other competition policy regimes when assessing
competition policy performance, the exercise is a flawed one that is effectively comparing
entirely different approaches to competition policy. In principle, a convergence may ensue
following an increased understanding of modern antitrust practice.

Differing Views on Policy Goals
There is reasonable uniformity among the recently adopted competition laws that antitrust should
protect competition, not competitors. Although there are instances of potentially contradictory
standards most modern competition legislation holds consumer welfare as the fundamental
standard for evaluating the effects of competition.
However, in many nations the presence of price instability derived from supply or demand
shocks results in price peaks in products favored by the populace. The competition agency may
be prodded into taking action by popular pressure even though the underlying cause may be
neither concerted activity by competitors nor a unilateral anticompetitive practice. This political
sensitivity is not a small country feature nor is it particular to developing economies. Indeed, the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission has been itself embroiled in countless investigations solicited by
congressmen or consumer groups alleging anticompetitive behavior in crude oil and derivative
markets (for example); investigations that have been ultimately dismissed.

Differences in Economic Concern
The effectiveness of a perception-based survey intent on gauging competition agency
performance necessarily implies that the interests of those businessmen responding to the
surveys coincide with the objectives of the competition agency. Efforts at measurement that
hinge on surveys of businessmen are thus likely to contain substantial biases: the interests of
businessmen in developing economies are not consistent with the objectives of the competition
agency.
First, in many developing economies, there is a belief that competition policy should stand as a
bulwark against the encroachment of domestic market share by foreign firms allegedly practicing
predatory pricing. To the dismay of that nation's domestic businessmen, a competition agency
may take no action against foreign entry or imports to the extent a competition agency properly
bases its assessments on the internationally accepted standard of maximizing consumer welfare.
Thus, for example, an agency in an African nation may be called on by domestic food vendors to
investigate the potential entry of a South African supermarket conglomerate. The complaints
may allege predatory practices reflecting the more competitive pricing of the more efficient
entrant. The investigation conducted by the competition agency may reveal no increased
likelihood of supracompetitive pricing and the agency--conducting an investigation "by the
book"--would table the matter. These same businessmen would subsequently award poor marks
to the competition agency on a survey of competition policy performance.

Second, in other countries, in many countries, business groups resent the preferential treatment
provided government owned quasi-private enterprises known as parastatals or the erstwhile
privatized former government operating agencies. The symbiotic relationship between the
parastatals and their governments impacts the performance of markets. In practical terms, the
agency may be powerless against parastatals who, after all, share the interest of the state.
Institutional Performance
Antitrust practice, with its full array of vertical and horizontal proscriptions is not only imprecise
and complex but it has a tendency to evolve over time. Moreover, investigations are typically
lengthy matters involving arcane procedural matters driven by local legal traditions and practice.
There are exogenous factors as well, that influence perceived agency performance. Most antitrust
laws provide recourse to local courts, whom, by definition, are unfamiliar with antitrust practice
and thus prone to cast the matter in terms of procedural differences ensuring long delays in the
matter. Unless a businessman survey respondent is intimately involved in an antitrust matter the
determination of institutional competence can be a difficult one. As a result, many businessmen
not privy to these operational difficulties tended to conclude that an agency was simply
performing poorly because there was no visible antitrust activity in the sense that there was little
or no coverage in business dailies.
Competition enforcement agencies are relatively small and tend to be rapidly overwhelmed in
procedural matters resulting in relatively few cases being brought to completion warranting little
discussion in the national media. This may possibly result in a popular perception based on the
treatment of the matter by the national media rather than on a learned understanding of the
underlying facts and jurisprudence. This may be particularly evident in nations where there is no
private cause of action allowed by the domestic competition law creating an example of the
availability heuristic (McFadden 2006) whereby survey respondents judge the relative
performance of a given event based on the ease with which it comes to mind. The more visible
the agency in the news media the more likely it will be to some, that it is discharging its
functions well. Conversely, a relative lack of discussion in the media will result in the perception
that the agency is dormant, earning it poor marks in any survey.
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Are antitrust performance indicators measuring competition policy performance or are they
simply reflecting the heterogeneous views of businesses? There appear to be fundamental
differences between businessmen's understanding of competition policy performance across
countries. We speculate that this may be due to the different perception of the most immediate
competitive "threats" affecting each country's business community coupled with a
misunderstanding of the role of the competition agency.
This asymmetry introduces policy preferences into measures of competition policy effectiveness
and thereby injects systematic bias into the reported metric in proportion to the extent that
competition policy mirrors or diverges from the interests of the surveyed businessmen as
reflected by a case's recency and media salience, or, in the case of halo effects, macroeconomic

performance. This may vitiate the usefulness of the metric since the objective of assessing
effectiveness is to determine whether the competition policy agency is capably discharging its
mission to enforce the law.
Our analysis suggests that care should be taken to ensure that stakeholders hold realistic
expectations of the proper role of antitrust policy. So far, the primary focus of donors and
supporters has been to ensure the professionalism and capacity of the law enforcement effort.
And although many agencies have actively sought to popularize their mission, they face
considerable structural and institutional limitations.
We believe that the success of competition policy programs awaits a more general understanding
by stakeholders of its realizable objectives and capabilities. Proper management of expectations
can enhance an agency's effectiveness.
APPENDIX
Table 2
Summary Statistics

Variable

Mean

Disagreement = 1
Log of Market Experience
Log of Annual Growth in Nominal GDP

0.1863
2.794
2.769

Standard
Deviation

Number

0.3913
0.6668
0.667

102
98
89

Table 3
Variable
Disagreement = 1
Disagreement = 0
Total

Frequency

Percent

20
83
103

80.6
19.4
100

Table 4
Variable
Log of Market Experience
Log of Growth in Nominal GDP

Disagreement = 1

Disagreement = 0

2.5807
2.317

2.955
2.854
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Table 1
Factors Influencing the Likelihood of Disagreement

Variable

Coefficient

Robust
Standard
Errors

2.139
-0.513
-0.6648

1.173
0.2676
0.2892

Log of Market Experience
Log of Annual Growth in
Nominal GDP (03/02)
Observations

Z

1.82
-1.92
-2.30

P> [absolute
value of Z]
0.068
0.055
0.022

66

Global Competitiveness Report 03/04; Competition Policy Survey.
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